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James E. Anderson 
It has long been recognized that the opportunity to trade is a technology, but it 
has not been possible to compare trading efficiency across time and space in 
the manner of the productivity literature. Anderson and Neary (1989) provide 
a rigorous general equilibrium theory of index numbers for quotas, the coeffi- 
cient of  trade utilization, which is the basis for intertemporal (and interna- 
tional) comparisons of trade restrictiveness. This paper further develops the 
new index and demonstrates its operation and significance to the partial equi- 
librium evaluation of U.S. cheese import policy from 1964 to 1979. 
There are three accomplishments. First, the operationality of the new index 
is established. Second, the time-series analysis of restrictiveness of the quota 
system reveals that the coefficient of trade utilization and the standard average 
tariff-equivalent  measure of restrictiveness yield opposite implications in over 
half the observations. The coefficient of trade utilization reveals wide fluctua- 
tions in restrictiveness dominated by  a significant reduction in the coefficient 
of trade utilization (a tightening of the average effective quota), at an average 
annual rate of (minus) 14 percent per year. The conventional measure, a trade- 
weighted average of  tariff equivalents, rises by  an average of  4 percent per 
year, which is very roughly consistent with the average quota change and the 
aggregate price elasticity of -  3.5 reported in Anderson (1983). In contrast, 
in eight out of the fifteen years, the average tariff  equivalent moved in the 
same direction as the coefficient of  trade utilization; that is, it had opposite 
implications for the direction of  restrictiveness. Third, the use of  the new 
index is shown to make a considerable difference to the interpretation of quota 
reform. The new method reveals a different structure than was shown in the 
Anderson (1985) study of the inefficiency of the U.S. cheese quota allocation 
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policy, which distributes imports on a by-commodity-by-country  basis. ' The 
reform reallocates the quota to equalize the unit rent subject to the same ag- 
gregate import of cheese. In the earlier study, the gain from an efficient policy 
was calculated to be about 15 percent of base expenditure on imported cheese, 
which  was about 30 percent  of the total gain possible  from a move to free 
trade.  Using the new method of  evaluation, the reform is equivalent to a 90 
percent increase in the average quota, which in turn is about 25 percent of the 
increase implied by a return to free trade. Also, using evaluation methods ill- 
suited to the comparison, the  earlier  study showed that  the efficiency gain 
from a commodity reallocation  with country allocations frozen was 1.8 per- 
cent of  the gain from a reallocation over both commodities and countries. In 
the present study, commodity reallocation alone picks up 15.6 percent of the 
gain from a full reallocation, nearly an order of  magnitude more. 
In a world where the only trade distortions are tariffs or subsidies, compar- 
isons of protection levels over time and space appear simple. A rough measure 
of  the trend in protectionism  or liberalization is seen in the time series of the 
trade-weighted average tariff or subsidy, while a cross section of average tar- 
iffs compares national distortions. Despite the common use of such measures, 
economists have long realized that their comparability is unfounded, as is the 
use of trade weights. The proliferation of nontariff barriers in the past twenty 
years has made it especially important to arrive at a full theory of index num- 
bers for trade distortions, since the methods to be used when new distortions 
are introduced are unknown, as are the appropriate weights. Using the meth- 
ods illustrated below, proper indices of partial and overall trading efficiency 
can be constructed for use in international trade negotiations and reform eval- 
uations. The present paper is confined to quota evaluation albeit in the pres- 
ence of tariffs (but see Anderson and Neary (1991) for development of tariff 
and tariff cum quota indices). 
If a single quota is to be evaluated, its restrictiveness could be measured by 
the rate of contraction of quantity below the free trade level or by the rate of 
increase of price above the free trade level (the tariff equivalent of the quota). 
With several quotas, the index number problem arises: What average quantity 
restriction or price increase represents the restrictiveness of  the system? The 
coefficient of trade utilization is a solution to the index number problem. It is 
defined to be the uniform contraction  factor applied to free trade quantities 
which is equivalent in welfare to the actual quota vector. The general equilib- 
rium structure of the trading economy provides the weights to be used in con- 
structing this index, and these turn out to be operational. 
Current methods of  evaluation  require  information  on quota premia, an 
elasticity of  import demand, and the trade data. The new method uses only 
these data and a new variable indicating the share of quota rents transferred to 
1. In 1980, a partial reform allowed national cheese quotas to be  shifted across cheese cate- 
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foreigners. Quota rents are usually shared, and the rent retention rate is im- 
portant; the cheese results show that including it alters the reform evaluation 
measure by  40 percent.  Since rent retention will be  needed in any correct 
analysis, the new measure places no added burden on the empirical worker; it 
is a practical measure. However, to evaluate quotas, it is critical to obtain 
information on the notoriously elusive quota premia. 
Section 8.1 reviews the coefficient of  trade utilization concept, following 
Anderson and Neary (1989, 1991), and presents some extensions. Section 8.2 
reviews the structure of U.S. cheese imports, very closely following Ander- 
son (1985). Section 8.3  presents the results of applying the new concept to the 
U.S. cheese market. Section 8.4 concludes with suggestions for further work. 
8.1  The Coefficient of 'kade Utilization 
This section reviews the coefficient of trade utilization concept of Anderson 
and Neary in 8.1.1, and applies it by  (1) spelling out a partial equilibrium 
version and (2) extending its use to time-series evaluations in the manner of 
the productivity literature. Section 8.1.2 makes clear the relative advantage of 
the coefficient of trade utilization over previous methods. 
8.1.1  Review 
The coefficient of trade utilization is the uniform contraction factor applied 
to free trade quantities (or any reform quantities) which is equivalent in wel- 
fare to the actual quota vector (see eq. [5] below). This is also the ratio of the 
shadow value of the new quota bundle-the  free trade bundle-to  the shadow 
value of quotas needed to maintain the initial level of welfare. Anderson and 
Neary identify the proper weights and thus provide a rigorous foundation for 
distortion averages, such as have been attempted without an adequate theory 
in the form of tariff averages.* 
It is necessary to be precise about the sense in which the distortion index 
values are comparable internationally or intertemporally. Ordinal utilities are 
not  comparable.  A  legitimate comparison of  the effect  of  distortions can 
nevertheless be made. Suppose a trade reform improves the efficiency of trade 
utilization by more in country A than country B. Then country B would have 
a greater real income increase if it reduced trade distortion at the rate of coun- 
try A, while country A would have a smaller real income increase if  it cut 
trade distortion at the rate of country B. 
Anderson and Neary (1989) deal with a general equilibrium measure that 
incorporates all quotas, but it is possible to restrict the set of  instruments to 
those regarded as feasible to reform in a trade negotiation. The present paper 
defines a partial coefficient of trade utilization for trade reform in one sector 
and applies it to cheese. Partial distance measures of  distortion are of course 
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subject to the difficulty that welfare may not always increase with a cut in the 
distortion. 
The coefficient of trade utilization will be defined in three stages. First, the 
Dixit and Norman (1980) textbook description of a distorted trading equilib- 
rium is amended to allow quotas with rent sharing. Second, the distorted trad- 
ing equilibrium  implicitly relates  a utility level for the representative con- 
sumer to the quota levels. This relation is made explicit in the distorted trade 
utility function. Finally, Deaton's (1979) distance function concept is used to 
relate a reform value of the quota to the current level of  the distorted trade 
utility function. This is the coefficient of trade utilization. 
The foundation is the trade expenditure function E(~,T,u),  where p  is the 
domestic price vector of  quantity-constrained trade,  IT  is the domestic price 
vector of unconstrained trade, and u is the utility level of  the representative 
consumer. Shepard's Lemma implies that the desired trade quantities (excess 
demands)  are E,  for the  constrained  goods  and EIT for the  unconstrained 
goods. A fundamental requirement of trade equilibrium is the external budget 
constraint,  with  the simplest textbook case  arising with  free and balanced 
trade: E(p,a,u) = 0. For distorted trade, the external budget constraint is in 
external prices, p* and IT*,  differing fromp and IT. Thus 
where R is a net deficit or surplus (equal to zero in the textbook case), t is the 
specific tax vector for the unconstrained goods (equal to IT  -  IT*,  where IT* 
is the foreign price), Q is the quota vector, and w is the fraction of the quota 
rent transferred to foreigners. The term (1 - w)[p -  p*]Q  is the quota rent 
retained at home, while tEn is the tariff revenue. Equation (1) implies that net 
trade expenditure in domestic price equals the transfer R plus the tariff revenue 
plus the retained quota rent. The quantity constraints imply market clearing 
relations 
The system of equation (l)-(2) defines the equilibrium domestic price vector 
p and the equilibrium utility u as functions of the trade distortions Q,  o,  and t 
and of the exogenous net surplus R. 
Anderson and Neary (1989) build a general equilibrium basis for reform 
evaluation setting R equal to zero. The distorted trade utility function is de- 
fined implicitly as the level of utility attained when (l)-(2)  hold in equilib- 
rium: 
3. The difficulty is reduced but not eliminated when the full distance measure is used. 225  The Coefficient of  Trade Utilization 
The derivatives of this function with respect to the policy variables Q are de- 
veloped in Anderson and Neary (1989). In particular, vp  is proportional to the 
general equilibrium shadow price of a quota, p. A very important special case 
for practical work, illustrated in the application below, is implicit separability: 
E@,  l.r,u)  = Ei+@Aq(~,~M9 
where + and  q are  subexpenditure functions for the quota and  nonquota 
goods, respectively. In this case, Anderson and Neary (1992) show that the 
shadow price of quotas has the particularly simple form: 
where E is the aggregate elasticity of demand for the constrained group and 7 
is the import-weighted average ad valorem tariff on the unconstrained goods. 
For the present paper it is not necessary to consider the derivatives vr since 
“other tariffs” are assumed to be fixed. But it is necessary to extend Anderson 
and Neary’s (1989) measure to the case where some quotas (such as those on 
textiles) are not under control or study. This is easy, since under separability 
(4)  continues to hold for any single quota. Let Q denote the focus group of 
quotas, and let X denote all other quotas; v(Q.) becomes temporarily v(Q,X,  a), 
and the vector p has elements restricted to those dual to Q. Thus there is no 
extra generality in carrying around terms in X. If  separability does not hold 
(i.e., suppose the X goods enter via a subexpenditure function such that there 
is a difference in the cross-price elasticities between Q and Z on the one hand 
and between X and Z on the other hand), the formula analogous to (4)  contains 
in  addition a composition effect term driven by  the difference in cross-price 
elasticities. This possibility is suppressed below due to lack of  information 
and a belief that it is not a significant source of bias. 
Now the coefficient of trade utilization can be defined. Figure 8.1 illustrates 
it for the case of two quotas. The term v(Q,,Q2, . . .) = u is an indifference 
curve in the quota space, with the subscript denoting an element of the quota 
vector, Q’  = (Q,,Q2). (Ignore the K and L labels on the two axes and the y 
label on the indifference curve at this point.) Point A is a quota point not on 
the indifference curve, possibly associated with a reform. Following Deaton 
(1979), point A is evaluated relative to the quota setting necessary to maintain 
u by using the distance function: the radial expansion or contraction necessary 
to move from A onto the indifference curve. On the diagram, the scalar factor 
A equal to OAIOB is the distance measure of the value of point A: the coeffi- 
cient of trade utilization. 
An  alternative equivalent definition is important for interpretation and em- 
pirical work. Note that at B, there is a supporting “budget” plane tangent to 
the indifference curve there. Its slope is equal to minus the ratio of the shadow 
prices of the quotas, and the value of the budget is the shadow value of dis- 226  James E. Anderson 
K, I 
Fig. 8.1  The distance function 
torted trade which supports u. The shadow value of  the quota bundle at A is 
represented on figure 8.1 by a plane through A with slope equal to the slope 
of  the indifference curve at B. The alternative definition of the coefficient of 
trade utilization is the shadow value of the bundle at A relative to the shadow 
value of  distorted trade necessary to support u. Intuitively, a higher budget 
implies a potential increase in welfare. 
For perspective, it is important to relate the coefficient of trade utilization 
to  two  other  literatures.  First,  the  theory  of  trade  distortions,  following 
Meade, essentially explored conditions under which the budget line could be 
shown to shift out. The shadow price of quotas result (4) is in that spirit: a rise 
in an element of the quota vector raises the budget line if the shadow price is 
positive. The post-Meade literature, reflecting its theoretical orientation, was 
not concerned with scaling the shift. Practically oriented approaches to trade 
policy require comparability of one shift with another, however, and thus the 
applied literature has made do with inappropriate scaling factors. Since the 
shadow prices are determined only up to a factor of proportionality, the scal- 
ing  factor can  be  called  a normalization.  The coefficient of  trade  utiliza- 
tion defines an appropriate normalization and thus opens the way to compara- 
bility. 
Second, in sharp contrast, the theory of productivity measurement from its 
inception has been empirically oriented and has always used what are now 
known to be distance function methods. Thus on figure 8.1 the axes can be 
relabeled with  the inputs K  and L  on the axes, and the contour can be an 
isoquant: y =  AK,L).  Point A is an inefficient point (using outmoded technol- 
ogy, or reflecting some inefficiency due to policy). The scale factor T = OBI 
OA represents the factor by which the input bundle at A can be shrunk and 
still maintain output of  y.  The slope of  the isoquant at B represents minus the 
ratio of the factor prices and the level of the budget line the minimum cost. 227  The Coefficient of  Trade Utilization 
The distance measure of technical efficiency is the ratio of the cost associated 
with A to the minimum cost needed to produce y.  The main practical use of  T 
is in its rate of change form 
f = p -  (aK  + (1 -  a)i), 
where f  is the famous rate of growth of total factor productivity, j  is the rate 
of  change  of  output,  a is  the  competitive cost  share of  payments  to  K, 
(1 - a)  is the cost share of  payments to L, and K,i  are the input rates of 
change. 
Now  consider the connection of the two uses of  the distance concept. In 
levels, the same operation (inverted, reflecting the difference between con- 
sumption of Q,  and Q,  and input demand for K,L)  obviously defines both. The 
practical use of T is in its rate of change form, where the shares and the input 
rates of change are ~bservable.~  The coefficient of trade utilization has an en- 
tirely analogous rate of change form developed below, where the role of com- 
petitive cost share is taken by “shadow value of quotas share.” Using equation 
(4),  these also are observable, as are the Qs.~  The same techniques and means 
of  interpreting and comparing total factor productivity growth rates are thus 
immediately available for interpreting and comparing the rate of  change of 
trading efficiency as measured by the coefficient of trade utilization. 
To return to a formal development of the coefficient of trade utilization, the 
distance in Q space from an arbitrary bundle Q to an arbitrary general equilib- 
rium utility contour v(-)  = u is its basis. Paralleling Hicks, there are “com- 
pensating variation” (the distance from the new bundle to the old utility con- 
tour) and “equivalent variation” (the distance from the old bundle to the new 
contour) measures of the total trade inefficiency. I assume vA = -  v,‘Q/A2 is 
negative.6 First, the compensating variation form of  the coefficient of trade 
utilization is implicitly defined as the value of A such that 
v(QIIA,w;t,p*,n*,R)  = uo. 
A exceeds unity for a reform in restricted trade when  Q’ is the new  trade 
bundle and uo is the old trade utility (associated with trade restraint Qo).  A is 
4. Strictly speaking, the distance operation picks up technical-efficiency change only for fixed 
factor prices. When factor prices vary, it is necessary to use for K,  L  that portion of the change in 
input usage that is econometrically explained by changes in the factor prices. The residual changes 
in factor usage (in an estimated factor demand system) are the “factor augmentation rates.” T is 
alternately the share-weighted average of the factor augmentation rates. 
5. A careful  reader, in light of  the previous note, will  observe that the coefficient of  trade 
u!ilization  could claim a greater degree of  accuracy than the standard productivity measure. The 
Qs are directly measured,  while the input rate of change residuals needed for productivity mea- 
surement reflect measurement error, misspecification of all sorts, estimation bias, and so forth. 
Much of the last thirty years of the productivity literature is devoted to explaining the residual in 
terms of underlying elements, a development that is entirely bypassed here. 
6. The assumption that the shadow value of trade distortions be positive is analogous to a more 
familiar condition that trade revenue be  positive but is more restrictive. The distance function 
method could still be used when va can change sign, but considerable care must be taken to avoid 
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equal to 1 when QI  is equal to Qo. A bears a close relation to Debreu’s coeffi- 
cient of resource utilization, hence its name. Second, the equivalent variation 
form is implicitly defined as the value of A* such that 
v(QO/A*,o;t,p*,n*,R) = u* 
for some arbitrary feasible reform utility u*. Defining A*  in this way implies 
that a value less than one is a welfare improving reform.’ The equivalent var- 
iation measure A* is in principle superior to A because of its transitivity prop- 
erty. It is a “quota-metric’’ utility function since it compares the new  utility 
level to the old bundle Qo  and, due to ordinality, A*u can be set equal to 1. The 
compensating variation measure need not be transitive, but it is more practical 
since it compares the new bundle to the old utility, whereas the equivalent 
variation requires using the complete general equilibrium model to compute 
the new level of real income. Transitivity of A is guaranteed in the special case 
of  homothetic preferences (see Chipman and Moore 1980), which obtains in 
the application below.  In the remainder of this discussion I stick to the com- 
pensating variation form.  Equation  (5)  uses the bundle Q’ as a reference, 
standing for a reformed Q, with rises in  A measuring improvements in the 
efficiency of  utilization of  the trade opportunity. For a reform going all the 
way to free trade, Ql is equal to the free trade bundle. 
From its implicit solution in (5),  A is homogeneous of degree one in Q, and 
it has derivatives proportional to the shadow price of quotas vector, p. This 
allows a further refinement, following Deaton. The alternative measure of  A 
suggested by figure 8.1 is the shadow value of Q relative to the shadow value 
of distorted trade needed to support u. How  is the normalization factor, the 
denominator of  the distalice measure, to be defined? An  “expenditure func- 
tion” is  suggested by  the diagram: the  Q bundle can be  regarded  as  the 
“shadow-expenditure-minimizing” selection of  Q subject to  given  shadow 
prices p and given u. If  v is quasi-concave in Q, this is unexceptionable. Un- 
fortunately, as is well known, v need not always be quasi-concave in Q. A 
further hypothesis of “efficient protection” might then be applied to rule out 
selection of  points in Q space which are in the nonconcave portions of  the 
indifference curves. Let G be the minimum value of distorted trade revenue: 
(7)  G(p,u;w,t,p*,n*,R)  = min { p’Q 1  v(Q,o;t,p*,n*,R)  = u} . 
G(.)  has all the standard expenditure function properties in p. Dual to G is a 
distance function (Deaton 1979): 
Q 
7. A* can be used for partial reform evaluation, but it is not generally defined in the move all 
the way to free trade, since Qo  is not generally a radial contraction of the free trade trade vector. 
(The two measures are trivially identical in the two good case.) This means that vA* passes through 
zero somewhere, violating the assumption needed for use of the implicit function theorem. Stem 
(1986) discusses similar problems which arise when the distance function is used in consumer 
theory with labor supply as a choice variable. 229  The Coefficient of  Trade Utilization 
(8)  A(Q,u;w,t,p*,~*,R) = min {p‘Q I G(p,u;w,t,p*,T*,R)  = l), 
where G(.)  = 1 is the normalization rule for quota shadow prices. Due to its 
derivation in (8), A is homogeneous of  degree one in Q and concave.8 The 
concavity of A is especially useful in index number construction over discrete 
changes, since it justifies simple operational approximations which are an av- 
erage of  the Paasche and Laspeyres indices9 (see, e.g., Caves, Christensen, 
and Diewert 1982). 
The two principal uses of  A applied below are (i) the evaluation of  actual 
quota policy over time and (ii) the evaluation of trade reform. In other work it 
will also be useful to compare the index of trading efficiency across countries. 
For the first use of (1  8), 
(9)  A = CpiQi + (uAU/A)li  + (RA,/A)R + (nAJA).ir  + . . . , 
where pi is the shadow quota rent share for quota i, piQi/p’Q, and the sum of 
the p’s is unity (it is not necessarily true that all are positive, although positive 
shadow prices were found in the work below). Equation (9) allows for the 
influence of other price changes .ir, the capital transfer R, and real income li. 
The latter is assumed to be growing exogenously to the process of quota pol- 
icy, which is surely reasonable for the case of U.S. imported cheese. For sim- 
plicity in the calculations, the influence of  all changes save real income are 
suppressed. Fortunately, for the case of homothetic preferences, the elasticity 
of A with respect to real income is -  1 .lo  Thus, 
P 
(9’)  A = CpiQ; -  P. 
This has the intuitive implication that a quota vector which grows less fast 
than the real income growth rate is increasing trade restrictiveness. 
The second important use of equation (8) is to evaluate trade reform: 
(10)  h = Cp;Qi’ 
where the same condition on the shares holds. In this case the proportional 
changes in the quotas are imposed by the reform structure. 
8. Since v(Q,n) need not be concave in Q, the minimizing assumption “concavifies” the under- 
lying preferences. In the proposed use of A in evaluating trade reform, this is appropriate because 
we regard the planner or analyst as evaluating proposed bundles Q relative to the minimum value 
of distorted trade needed to support uo.  In the equivalent variation form, proposed reforms result- 
ing in utilities u* are evaluated by  comparing the value of  bundles Qo to the minimum value of 
distorted trade needed to support u*. 
9. In practice, when v( ) is not concave in Q, the change in the true index need not lie between 
the conventional measure of the change in the Paasche and Laspeyres indices. The true measure 
requires calculations of the minimizing shadow prices. 
10. The market-clearing relations are E,  = Q. For homotheticity, E,(p,n,u) = uE,’(p,n). 
Then Q/A = uE,’(p,n). Constant restrictiveness (constant A with no change inp) is possible only 
if Q grows at the same rate as u. 230  James E. Anderson 
It is important to emphasize that 8 is conceptually identical to the produc- 
tivity measures like f  used to track the behavior of  economies over time and 
space. It converts the actual or proposed changes into a uniform equivalent 
change in trade, just as the productivity index is a uniform equivalent growth 
in factors. Also, like the productivity measure, it is operational and offers a 
basis of comparison of trade policies.  The natural units of the coefficient of 
trade utilization and the public’s familiarity with productivity measures give it 
an added advantage in communicating the results of policy evaluations. 
8.1.2  Comparison with Current Methods 
The coefficient  of  trade  utilization  is a proper  index of  trade distortions. 
The index which is commonly used by default for intertemporal comparisons 
is a trade-weighted  average of  tariffs, or in the present case of “tariff equiva- 
lents” of quotas. It has well-known  defects due to the substitution effect: a 
high tariff equivalent will be associated with a small quota, other things equal. 
In section 8.3 an index of  this type is constructed for cheese imports in the 
U.S.  from 1964 to 1979 and its rate of  change is contrasted with the rate of 
change of te coefficient of trade utilization. If the two measures agree in their 
implication  for restrictiveness,  a rise in the average tariff equivalent should 
coincide with a fall in the coefficient of trade utilization. It is highly significant 
that for eight of the fifteen observations on one-year changes, protection mea- 
sured by the average tariff equivalent moved in the same direction as the coef- 
ficient of trade utilization. 
Other measures of the effect of trade distortions have different purposes and 
thus do not permit comparison over space and time. For example, when cor- 
rectly applied the standard measures of the effect of trade reform (compensat- 
ing and equivalent income variations) give correct measures of the shift in the 
relevant general equilibrium budget constraint (the shift from B to A),  but they 
lack a scale (normalization) that would permit comparisons. Some analysts 
report the unscaled compensating or equivalent variation numbers. This biases 
the measure upward for large countries in cross-country comparisons and for 
later periods  in  intertemporal comparisons.  Several varieties  of  scale have 
been attempted. For large reforms such as complete free trade, it is usual to 
report  the  compensating variations  as  fractions of  national  income.  This 
biases the measure  downward in cross-country  comparisons  for “naturally” 
less open economies like that of  the United States. A more sophisticated ver- 
sion of the expenditure function model, which appears to allow comparability, 
arises when the effect of the reform is scaled by the trade expenditure or by 
the total gain from trade.  I used both expedients in partial equilibrium in my 
1985 cheese paper reviewed in the next section. 
While the ratios of compensating variations to either the trade expenditure 
or the gain from trade are natural,  they are not appropriate  for comparison 
purposes. With the compensating variation methods that typically would be 
used, let Qo and Q’  be two quota vectors with associated domestic prices po 231  The Coefficient of  Trade Utilization 
and p'.  Suppose for simplicity that all rent is retained domestically. The gain 
from trade reform measure relative to base expenditure is 
E(p',.rr,uo) -  E(po,.rr,uo)  + net rent change 
(1 1) 
For proper applications, the numerator is a legitimate measure of the income 
which could be deducted from the representative consumer facing the new 
prices while maintaining uo. The denominator measure is the net  trade ex- 
penditure, equal in general equilibrium to the base quota rent plus any trans- 
fer. The ratio (1 1) is the proportion of  base expenditure (rent plus transfer) 
that could be deducted from the representative consumer facing the new prices 
while maintaining uo. Thus far, all is well. But consider a new initial pointp2, 
associated, for example, with a more restrictive initial condition and hence a 
lower u2.  If the compensating variation is transitive, the value of the numerator 
in the move from 2 to 1 will exceed the value of the numerator in the move 
from 0 to  1; that is, the two values of  the numerator will correctly sign the 
welfare comparison. But the two proportionate changes are no longer compa- 
rable; they do not have the same base. In Anderson (1985), reviewed in the 
next section, equation (1 1) was used with the wrinkle that the partial equilib- 
rium nature of the study meant that the denominator was total expenditure on 
cheese. 
The alternative measure used in Anderson (1985) and sometimes applied 
elsewhere is the relative inefficiency measure for quota reform: 
E(p',~r,uO)  -  E(po,.rr,uo) + net  revenue change 
(12) 
where the denominator is the gain from a complete liberalization of trade (the 
gain from free trade in the cheese sector in the application below). Once again 
the denominator shifts with the initial condition and vitiates comparability. 
Finally, it is conceivable to scale by the value of the leap from autarky to free 
trade: pa is set equal to the autarky level. This does resolve the noncompara- 
bility issue of  the preceding two scales but is infeasible, since calculation of 
autarky prices is rarely credible. 
In  contrast, the coefficient of  trade utilization is a proper index for trade 
distortions. In all cases, the practitioner can use an appropriate transformation 
to accommodate shifts in the nondistortion variables (note that there is no 
apparent way to extend the measures above) and can be certain that all trade 
distortions are evaluated using true shadow prices. The comparability prob- 
lem is solved in principle. 
E(pO  9 Tr  9 uO) 
Ep(p",7F,u0)p* -  E(p*,.rr,uO) 
8.2  The Cheese Import Model 
I review here  a portion of  my  (1985) paper,  in order to provide a self- 
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potential large welfare inefficiency implied by  the common practice of allo- 
cating quotas at a detailed by-commodity-by-country  level and prohibiting 
resale. U.S. cheese imports were selected for study because the data were 
good, the quotas were so allocated, and the domestic policy objective in lim- 
iting cheese imports apparently did permit a reallocation over types, while 
preserving  the same aggregate level of  imports. An  econometric model of 
cheese demand was fitted to use in the welfare evaluation. 
In this paper the data are used for two applications. First, the data for the 
earlier study are used along with the estimated aggregate elasticity of cheese 
demand to form a time series of the rate of change of the coefficient of trade 
utilization. Second, the 1985 exercise is repeated but with the coefficient of 
trade utilization as the welfare measure. 
I first describe the market for imported cheese in the United States and then 
explain the computation of reform magnitudes for the second exercise. 
8.2.1 
The U.S. dairy quota system originated as a by-product of the dairy price 
support system. The main element is support of a manufacturing-grade milk 
price, but there are also butter and American-type cheese support prices. To 
avoid supporting foreign farmers, quotas have been imposed on a variety of 
cheeses under executive authority, which is very broad. 
The essential principle of the quota system is, however, to set detailed lev- 
els of imports on a basis consistent with historic proportions. The presidential 
quota authority does not stipulate that this principle is to be carried through to 
allocation by  country of  origin,  but the quota administrators have  so pro- 
ceeded. In contrast, quota administrators appear to regard their objective as a 
target level of milk-equivalent tonnage in groups identified as substituting for 
domestic milk products (see, e.g., Emery 1969,9-11). 
Thus the stated objective of  the quota administrators supports a noneco- 
nomic constraint of  the simple form in  which individual by-commodity-by- 
country quotas could be reallocated subject to a constant total. Despite this, 
the  current allocation system creates detailed binding  quotas.  The USDA 
(U.S. Department of Agriculture) quota system administrators develop license 
allocations by commodity by country from base-year allocations in the legally 
mandated categories. They claim to have effective auditors who implicitly 
frustrate resale of  licenses. Measured differences in average quota rent mar- 
gins, reported in Anderson (1985), bear out the claim. 
The Census trade data have nine commodity categories of continuously im- 
ported cheese plus a catch-all, with six of the nine plus a part of the catch-all 
category subject in part or whole to quota constraint. This creates the circum- 
stances for a case study of quota inefficiency when the quota constraints are 
converted into an overall constraint on the six categories. Inefficiency arises 
due to (1) inefficient allocation by  country within the same cheese type (a 
matter of administrative discretion) and (2) inefficiency allocation over types 
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(partially mandated  in  current  presidential proclamations, but  presumably 
easily changed within the spirit of presidents’ previous exercises of authority). 
I now rationalize a partial equilibrium approach to the U.S. market for im- 
ported cheese. The United States is a small consumer of  foreign cheese; hence 
the foreign price of  foreign cheese is reasonably taken to be exogenous, Its 
domestic price in quota constrained categories is of course endogenous. U. S. 
consumption of cheese is a tiny fraction of total food consumption, so ignor- 
ing spillover effects onto noncheese prices may be reasonable; the prices are 
assumed to be exogenous. The domestic price of domestic cheese is endoge- 
nous save when the government is maintaining a floor price through large 
purchases.  Endogenous  domestic  prices  of  both  imported  and  domestic 
cheese were fitted to an implicit reduced form in the econometric work on 
cheese demand discussed in Anderson (1983). The “fitted prices” were used 
as instruments in estimation of the demand system. 
In principle, it is possible to model the supply side of the domestic cheese 
industry. Domestic cheese production and sale is dominated by  and large by 
the government’s milk, cheese, and butter price supports. Successfully deal- 
ing with the supply side of the domestic cheese markets probably requires a 
model of how the government sets its supports. Fortunately, in the welfare (as 
opposed to the econometric) analysis it is permissible to treat the U.S. price 
of  U.S.  cheese and related dairy products as independent of  import policy 
changes, since it can be assumed that the government will offset any domestic 
price effect by support purchase. This is effectively true in a large part of the 
sample (1964-79),  particularly in the later years. 
A nine-equation model of  imported cheese demand was estimated for the 
years 1964-79.  An implicitly separable food and beverage expenditure func- 
tion is assumed to exist for a representative U.S. consumer identifiable in the 
aggregate data (see Anderson  1983 for discussion of  the implied assump- 
tions). The almost ideal demand system (AIDS) expenditure function is used, 
with the further wrinkle that only a tiny portion of  total food and beverage 
consumption is estimated-that  for nine imported cheeses (see Deaton and 
Muellbauer 1980 for a general treatment of AIDS). AIDS is used because it is 
a flexible function form with particularly simple capability for allowing non- 
homothetic preferences while permitting exact linear aggregation. 
The results reported in Anderson (1983) were reasonably “good,” with sen- 
sible elasticities, absence of obvious specification bias, and a good fit. The 
null hypothesis of homotheticity could not be rejected in a joint test.  As  is 
common in flexible functional form estimation, however, concavity of the de- 
mand system was rejected in unconstrained estimation, and had to be enforced 
about the point of means. The main additional sources of  possible specifica- 
tion error are in aggregation over consumers and over cheeses. The data do 
not permit an attack on these problems. To  give some feel for the demand 
structure that results, appendix table 3.A1 in Anderson (1988) presents point 
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the point of means of the shares. These imply an aggregate price elasticity of 
demand for imported cheese as a group of  -3.54,  which is plausible for a 
product group with good domestic substitutes. A reader skeptical of the econ- 
ometric methods used is free to regard these and the underlying parameters as 
plausible guesses to be used in simulation. 
8.2.2  The Cheese Quota Reform Exercise 
The essential ingredients of  the study of cheese import inefficiency are the 
trade quantities and prices (see Anderson  1983, 1985, for more details on 
these  data). Domestic auction  prices  and  foreign port  values of  imported 
cheeses were obtained from USDA and Census data. The domestic part of the 
total quota premium equals the difference between these less a marketing mar- 
gin based on similar unconstrained imported cheeses. These are converted to 
annual averages for the calculations below. The foreign part of the quota pre- 
mium is based on data reported in Boisvert, Homig, and Blandford (1988). 
The trade quantities come from Census data. 
The theoretical analysis of  my  earlier paper (1985) derives the efficient" 
reallocation of existing quotas policy as equivalent to a uniform specific tariff 
that would achieve the same aggregate quantity of  constrained cheese. The 
estimated demand functions evaluated at the point of means can be substituted 
into the constraint and the resulting equation solved for the efficient tariff. 
Thus the model solves fort in 
q(p*  + t,u) = Q, 
where Q is the aggregate quota constraint, and, by  Shepard's Lemma, Epi is 
the demand for the ith quota-constrained cheese. (Strictly speaking, u changes 
with the reform, but the change is trivial.) The estimated AIDS demand func- 
tion is used for Epi. After t is solved, a welfare analysis of the reform is cal- 
culated. The replication of these results is reported in the next section. 
8.3  The Results 
Two  uses of  the new concept of  trading efficiency are made here.  I  first 
present the time-series results. The sixteen-year period of the data was marked 
by  considerable fluctuation in the restrictiveness of  the various quotas, with 
an overall dramatic increase in restrictiveness. Most notably, the coefficient of 
trade utilization and the average tariff equivalent give opposite implications in 
over half the observations. Second, I reevaluate the potential improvement in 
trade efficiency due to an efficient allocation of cheese imports as in Anderson 
(1985). The surprise here is that the by using the coefficient of trade utilization 
measure, the relative importance of the commodity-alone reallocation grows 
from less than two per cent to over a fifteen per cent of the commodity-and- 
1 I. Based on eq. (4), I now know what I did not in 1985, that the implied reform, while more 
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country reallocation gain. The inefficient allocation is equivalent to  14 (89) 
percent reduction in average constrained cheese imports under commodity- 
alone (commodity-and-country) reallocation. 
8.3.1 
Using equation (9’), we can readily calculate the local rate of change of the 
coefficient of trade utilization. For discrete changes, it is customary to use p 
shares that are the arithmetic average of the shares at the two end points. This 
procedure is exact for the translog form of the underlying function A and is 
appropriate for any concave function A in the sense that the true value of the 
change in  A  must  lie between  the  values formed using  the new  and  old 
shares.’*  Thus, while A is not a translog (despite the essentially translog struc- 
ture of the AIDS system), and indeed has no closed form, I assume the usual 
procedure, which  would generally be used  by  other practitioners, is close 
enough.  l3 
To  control for noise in such disaggregated data, the Q series is based on the 
calculated demands rather than the measured imports.  l4 The tariff rate used in 
constructing the shadow price of quotas, p, is set at the import-weighted av- 
erage ad valorem rate on all imports in each year. The aggregate elasticity of 
demand for constrained imports is obtained from the AIDS system and the 
standard formula 
The Increase in Restrictiveness, 1964-1979 
where the  E~’S  are the partial elasticities of demand, estimated in Anderson 
(1983). At the point of means,  E is equal to -  3.54. The results reported be- 
low hold it constant rather than the more refined version allowing the elasticity 
to vary endogenously. The differences are minor. The data series reported in 
section 8.2  yield the quota premium based on the average eternal f.a.s. price. 
12. This follows from a straightforward application of the mean value theorem for a concave 
function. By concavity, 
A,(P)[Q’  - 91  2 A(Q’) -  Aceo) 2  A&Q’)[Q’ -  Qol. 
See Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) for more discussion. 
13. In principle,  it is possible to check the appropriateness of the assumption by calculating A 
from the nonlinear system 
Equations (i) and (ii) solve for p,A  in terms of R,u,T*,p*,t,  and w, using n = n*  + t. This 
can be done for the specific AIDS system estimated by Anderson. Time did not permit resolution 
of the convergence problems encountered here. 
14. The measured imports do not correspond exactly to the quotas due to (1) the Commerce 
Department’s practice of reporting the import data in the month in which the information arrives 
from the Customs Bureau rather than the month of shipment, and (2) minor inconsistencies in the 
statistical classification schemes. 236  James E. Anderson 
This lies above the foreign marginal cost due to rent captured by  foreigners, 
as Boisvert et al. (1988) show. Following their data, the rent retention rate o 
is set equal to .50. 
In contrast, the standard approach to summarizing developments in the im- 
port of cheese would be based on tariff equivalents of quotas, or quota premia. 
There is a great deal of  variation in the quota premia over time, and a rising 
trend predominates. While the correlation between the six premia time series 
is high, it is not perfect. Thus a highly diverse picture presents itself to the 
analyst, and prior to the methods of this paper there was no adequate way to 
summarize the developments. The main alternative would be the annual per- 
centage change in the trade-weighted average tariff  equivalent of  the quotas, 
which is reported below. 
The average annual rate of change of trade utilization, a, calculated using 
equation (9') as explained above is -  14 percent, effectively cutting in half 
the imports of cheese every six years. This average masks some spectacular 
annual variations. Table 8.1 presents the annual percentage changes in the 
coefficient of trade utilization for cheese imports from 1965 to 1979 in the first 
column. Notice the very restrictive policies followed in the mid and late 1970s 
with a break in 1976, a year in which a temporary relaxation of the quota was 
permitted to help in the political struggle against food price inflation. 
The annual percentage change in the trade-weighted average tariff equiva- 
lent of the quotas, f',  (T.E.) is presented in the second column. The average 
change over the fifteen years is 4  percent, doubling the average tariff rate every 
eighteen years, and similarly implying a sharp rise in restrictions. To provide 
Table 8.1  The Rate of Decline of Cheese 'kade Efficiency, 1965-1979 
Rate of  Change of 
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Average  .04  -0.138 
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contrast, the observations for which the two measures have the same sign 
(diverge in implication) are printed in boldface. This occurs in eight of fifteen 
cases. Another way  to describe the result is with correlation analysis. One 
might expect the two series to be  perfectly negatively correlated in  a rank 
sense. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for  the  two  series is  0.34, 
which does not permit rejection of the null hypothesis of no relation between 
the series. 
The level of restrictiveness on average in the sample period is high accord- 
ing to either measure. The average level of  ad  valorem tariff  equivalent is 
around 25 percent (the basis for the changes in table 8.1). It should be noted 
that this figure corresponds to the retained rent concept (1 - o)(p -  p*). 
The coefficient of trade utilization for the move to free trade is 2.3, meaning 
that a 130 percent average rise in quantity can be achieved. The two percent- 
ages are very roughly connected via the aggregate elasticity of -  3.5. 
Since all time series are substantially driven by  cyclical phenomena, it is 
worth noting that cyclic disturbances are purged by  the device of  using Qs 
calculated to lie on the demand functions, which should take care of much of 
the problem. A complete accounting of  cyclic versus other reasons for the 
behavior of effective trade policy is beyond the scope of this paper, but some- 
thing like 1966 to 1976 is a complete cycle, and the data do not suggest the 
dominance of cyclic phenomena in cheese policy. 
8.3.2  Reform Evaluation 
Section 8.2 reviews the background of  my  (1985) evaluation of  the effi- 
ciency gain from a reallocation of quota licenses subject to the constraint that 
the total import of cheese in constrained categories did not change, all evalu- 
ation being done at the point of means. Two variants were assessed. In one, 
the country allocations were frozen, so that the average foreign price of cheese 
in each category remained constant. A reallocation over the six types resulted 
in the gain shown in table 8.2, first row of column (1) (adapted from Ander- 
son). The other variant permitted reallocation to a (conservatively chosen) 
low-cost supplier, with results shown in the second row of  column (1). Two 
features of this study should be noted, because they contrast with the methods 
used below.  First, while apparently reasonable, the scaling methods used in 
table 8.2 have no real foundation in theory and can be misleading in reform 
evaluation because they do not use shadow prices. They result in rather mod- 
est measures of  gain which are not readily comparable with other reforms 
under other circumstances. Second, a notable implication of table 8.2  appears 
to be that the gain from a commodity reallocation is modest compared to the 
gain from picking a more efficient supplier, since .0028 (in the first row) is 
less than 2 percent of  .152 (in the second row). The coefficient of trade utili- 
zation permits a more appropriate scale that is quite intuitive. Its use turns out 
to revise upward the estimation of the efficacy of a commodity-alone reallo- 
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Table 8.2  Efficiency Gains from Cheese Quota Reform 
WelfardBase Expenditure 
Relative 
Efficient Tax  Free Trade  Inefficiency 
(1)  (2)  (  1  Y(2) 
No supply reallocation  ,0028  ,087  ,103 
Supply reallocation  ,152  .497  ,306 
Table 8.3  CTU Measure of Gains from Cheese Quota Reform 
9% Change in CTU 
Relative 
Efficient Tax  Free Trade  Inefficiency 
(1)  (2)  (  1  Y(2) 
No supply reallocation  .  I39  1.278  ,109 
Supply reallocation  .891  3.623  ,246 
Table 8.3 contains the calculated gain in the coefficient of trade utilization 
under the same circumstances. The entries have the interpretation of an aver- 
age percentage increase in the aggregate quota. Thus moving to an efficient 
quota (equivalent to that implied by  a uniform specific tax) under no supply 
reallocation is effectively a 14 percent increase in the aggregate quota, while 
under country reallocation the efficient quota is effectively a 90 percent in- 
crease in the average quota. 
Assessing the relative significance of country reallocation, .139 (in the first 
row) is about 16 percent of .891 (in the second row), so that commodity real- 
location alone is seen to be much more (almost ten times more) significant 
than with  the methods of  table  8.2. It is important to understand why  the 
results differ. 
The difference in results is mainly due to the difference in scaling factors: 
the results in table 8.2 are scaled by  base expenditure, while the results in 
table 8.3 use a proper normalization as a scaling factor. For example, in the 
first column of table 8.2, the ratio (1.11) is evaluated under commodity-alone 
and commodity-by-country reallocations.  The denominator (base expendi- 
ture) is the same in both cases, while the numerator of the expression evalu- 
ated in the second row of  table 8.2 is greater than that evaluated in the first 
row  by  (.152 - .0028)*(base expenditure). In  contrast, for the results re- 
ported in table 8.3, the coefficient of trade utilization concept normalizes the 
change in distortion revenue implied by  the new quota bundle minus the old 
bundle. The normalization factor is the shadow rent needed to support initial 
utility (or, the marginal shadow rents used to evaluate quota changes are nor- 
malized), so that the expressions evaluated in the second row of table 8.3  have 
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Table 8.4  Effect of Tariffs and Rent Sharing on CTU Gains 
% Change in CTU 
Pure Import  Tariff  Shadow 
Q  Effect  Price 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
No supply reallocation  0.132  0.102  .I39 
Supply reallocation  1.351  1.314  .891 
row.  In  this application the normalization reduces greatly the difference be- 
tween the first and second rows of table 8.3  relative to table 8.2. The normal- 
ization factor has a large influence because the terms of  trade effect of  the 
country reallocation  substantially increases some  of  the  marginal  shadow 
rents (a rise in trade is associated with an improvement in the terms of trade, 
raising the shadow price) over the value for the commodity-alone realloca- 
tion.l5 The scale in  table  8.3 is much more appropriate to comparisons of 
sources of inefficiency in the quota allocation, since it is a marginal concept. 
A careful reader might note that the reallocation in table 8.3 is not strictly 
comparable to the reallocation in table 8.2 due to the allowance for rent shar- 
ing in the latter but not in the former. This plays a minor role in the results, as 
it turns out. A calculation of the coefficient of trade utilization under the as- 
sumption of full rent retention yields gains of  .132 under commodity reallo- 
cation and  1.35 under commodity-by-country reallocation (see table 8.4 be- 
low), so that commodity-alone reallocation gets about 10  percent of the full 
gain, as opposed to 16 percent under the rent-sharing assumption and less than 
2 percent with the old measure. 
Since future applications of the coefficient of trade utilization will probably 
be with less adequate data, sensitivity to bad data is an important issue. There 
is no substitute for good information on the quota premiums, but the results 
of  this study suggest that the other elements of  the shadow price of quotas 
may  not be  of critical importance. Table 8.4 shows the coefficient of  trade 
utilization gain from the efficient quota under the two cases of supply reallo- 
cation with alternately the assumption of  a pure import (full rent retention) 
quota, the pure quota plus a tariff  on other goods, and the main case of a 50 
percent rent retention quota plus a tariff on other goods. The two effects go in 
opposite directions under the separability assumption, hence they tend to can- 
cel, as seen in the first row. In the second row this effect is combined with the 
effect of  a terms of  trade improvement from the country reallocation. Since 
15. Letp;  be the average foreign price of  imported cheese in category i. The country realloca- 
tion causes a drop in p*,. For the purposes of the calculation, this drop is related to the change in 
Q, by calculating the “derivative” dp,*/dQ,. The shadow price of the quota includes the component 
-  (1 -  w)p*@Q,  from differentiating (1).  Under the circumstances of  a reallocation toward low- 
price producers, P*~Q  equals nQ,[dp,*ldQ,]  and is negative. Thus the shadow price of the quota is 
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half of the terms of trade improvement will accrue to foreigners as rent (based 
on the rent-sharing data discussed above), and since this is bigger than the 
reduction in the domestic price as a result of the reform, the result is that the 
last column of the second row (.891)  is less than the second column (1.3  14). 
8.4  Conclusion 
This paper has illustrated the use of the coefficient of trade utilization con- 
cept for trade reform and for time-series evaluation of fixed trade policy in the 
U.S.  market for imported cheese from  1964 to  1979. The new  concept is 
readily operational and offers distinct advantages over current methods be- 
cause it solves the comparability problem. The significance of  this is illus- 
trated in two ways. In the first, a time-series index allows the intertemporal 
comparison of the quota policy implied in sixteen annual observations. In the 
second, two different quota reforms are compared in importance on a consist- 
ent basis. In both cases, the coefficient of trade utilization gives quite different 
implications than the common alternative. 
In future work I plan to expand the set of commodities covered and extend 
the years covered, looking to build a time series capable of assessing the over- 
all trend in U.S.  trade policy. I encourage other investigators to begin using 
this concept for other countries’ trade data. Eventually this will lead to a set 
of measures with which to compare national trade policies, one that is as easy 
for the public to understand as are productivity measures. 
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The paper has two parts. In the first part, Anderson illustrates and discusses 
the measure of  trade restriction developed earlier by  Anderson and Neary,’ 
which is named “coefficient of trade utilization” (CTU). In the second part, 
Anderson attempts to apply this measure to compare the degree of  U.S. re- 
strictions on imports of cheese over the sample period 1965-79. 
The theory behind the CTU measure is certainly an improvement over the 
traditional methods in that it is more micro founded. In a nutshell, the theory 
is as follows. Consider a small open economy. Let there be quantity restric- 
tions on imports of two or more commodities. Let this “quota” vector at time 
t be denoted by Q,. Assuming that these restrictions are binding, the equilib- 
rium domestic prices of these goods are endogenous and are higher than the 
respective foreign prices, the difference being the “quota rent” per unit. As- 
suming further that preferences are homothetic and alike across the domestic 
consuming units so that perfect aggregation holds, let V(Q,) be the indirect 
utility at the equilibrium. Now consider two periods, 0 and 1, respectively the 
base and the current period. Let Q,  and Q, be the corresponding quota vectors. 
In general, some elements of Q, will be greater than the corresponding ele- 
ments in Q,  and some will be less. So the problem is: How can we determine 
whether the current quota systems Q, is more or less restrictive than the orig- 
inal quota system Q,?  This is an index number problem. 
As a solution, CTU is defined by k where 
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There is some intuition in this. If, for example, all quantities in Q, are higher 
than those in Q,,  bundle 1 is surely less trade restrictive than bundle 0; k will 
be  clearly  greater than unity,  so  that  the  CTU associated  with bundle  1 is 
greater than that with bundle 0. The CTU resembles the Hicksian compensat- 
ing variation in income. 
Intuitive as it may seem, there is a tricky problem with the Anderson-Neary 
formula. It is that  by defining a common denominator k  for all quantities, 
some quantities  (elements) of Q,lk may exceed the corresponding  free trade 
quantities. If this is so, those (theoretical) quotas are not binding, and hence 
the corresponding prices will be their foreign prices, implying that the V(.) 
function is not the same between period 0 and period  1. In other words, the 
V(-)  function in the left-hand and right-hand sides of (1) may not remain in- 
variant. This may invalidate the comparison between Qo  and &,. Note that this 
is true even if both Q,  and Q, may be binding. 
Assuming  that the above problem is somehow solved, more generally, an 
axiomatic approach may be developed. Let us imagine a scalar k such that 
(1‘)  V(Q,,k;.  . . ) = V(Q0;  . . .), 
which defines k  = k(Q,,e,; . . .). One could begin by specifying some “de- 
sired‘’ axioms and then find if there exists a k(.)  function which satisfies those 
axioms. If yes, is it unique? Some of these axioms may be the following: 
(a)  Two-way consistency: If V(Q,$,) = V($)  and k, implies more trade re- 
striction, then k, defined by V(Q,,k,) = V(Q,)  should imply less trade re- 
strictions. 
(6) Three-way consistency or transitivity: If  V(Q,,k,) = V(Q,), V(Q,,k,) = 
V(Q,),  and both k, and k2 imply  more  (or less) trade restriction,  then k, 
defined by V(Q,,k,) = V($) should imply more (or less) trade restriction. 
(c) Independence of  irrelevant alternatives: This may perhaps be another de- 
sirable axiom, although  in some cases it may not be very appropriate.  If 
V(Q,,Q*,k*)  = V(Q,,Q*) and V(Q,,Q**,k**) = V(Q,,Q**), then k*  im- 
plies more trade restriction if and only if k**  implies more trade restriction. 
(d)  Homogeneity:  Let  V(Q,,k;  . . . )  =  V(Q,;  . . .). If  Q,  =  A&,,  then 
k = A. 
It is easy to verify that the Anderson-Neary  CTU formula does not satisfy 
axiom (c), because CTU appears as the common denominator of all quotas., 
On the other hand, axiom (c) itself can be argued to be inappropriate if in the 
quota basket the goods are sufficiently close substitutes of one another. In any 
event, it will be worthwhile to ask if there is an impossibility or possibility 
theorem regarding the existence and uniqueness of a k function that satisfies 
axioms (a)-(d). I am optimistic. My own hunch is that there is a possibility 
2. If, on the other hand, the CTU is designed to leave out the common quotas in two periods, it 
would then violate transitivity. This is true whether CTU is defined analogous to the compensating 
variation or the equivalent variation in income. 243  The Coefficient of Trade Utilization 
theorem. The exact functional form would of course depend upon the form of 
the indirect utility function. 
Coming to the empirical part, one of the major limitations, as the author 
points out, is the supply side of the model. The firm behavior is mostly as- 
sumed away. Doing so, Anderson ends up with a demand system model that 
is structural, whereas the equations that determine price are in reduced form. 
This is presumably due to a data problem-lack  of firm-level production and 
other data. However, given that such data are becoming increasingly avail- 
able, I  suppose that these types of  problems  will be overcome in  the near 
future. 
To  sum up,  this is an  interesting  and useful  paper. Although,  as I have 
illustrated, the CTU measure has its weaknesses as an index of trade restric- 
tions,  I think that it is a significant conceptual improvement over the usual 
indices of trade restriction. This Page Intentionally Left Blank